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TEACHING RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY: BLENDING COPYRIGHT AND 
TRADEMARK, COMMON LAW AND STATUTES, AND DOMESTIC 
AND FOREIGN LAW* 
DAVID S. WELKOWITZ** AND TYLER T. OCHOA*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Rights of publicity are the neglected stepchild in the family of intellectual 
property rights.  Among the leading intellectual property casebooks, most 
include only two or three cases concerning rights of publicity.1  Thus, in a 
typical survey course on intellectual property, rights of publicity often receive 
no more than one or two class sessions during the course of a semester.  Even 
in casebooks devoted specifically to trademark and unfair competition, 
copyright, or entertainment law, rights of publicity often are covered only as an 
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University. 
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 1. See, e.g., MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
1098–1133 (3d ed. 2007) (three principal cases); ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA 
ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, 
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 538–63 (2d ed. 2004) (two principal cases); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 178–215 (rev. 5th ed. 2004) (three principal cases); 
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 883–913 (4th ed. 2006) (three principal cases); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, 
DAVID W. BARNES & MICHAEL J. MADISON, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 234–42 
(2006) (one principal case).  Two casebooks published in 2007 have four principal cases each.  
See SHUBHA GHOSH, RICHARD GRUNER, JAY P. KESAN & RICHARD I. REIS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE 
ACTIVITY 630–66 (2007); DAVID LANGE, MARY LAFRANCE & GARY MYERS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 278–346 (3d ed. 2007). 
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additional subsidiary topic,2 and usually receive no more than two class 
sessions, or perhaps two weeks (four class sessions) at the most.  (Some first-
year property casebooks use the right of publicity to introduce the subject of 
intellectual property;3 and some first year torts casebooks include rights of 
publicity in a discussion of privacy law;4 but again, typically only one or two 
cases are explored.) 
There are at least three possible reasons for this neglect.  First, unlike 
patent, trademark, and copyright, rights of publicity are governed by a 
patchwork quilt of state statutes and common-law decisions, rather than by a 
 
 2. See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: LAW & POLICY 783–827 (2d ed. 2007) (five principal cases); JANE C. GINSBURG, 
JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 675–723 (4th ed. 2007) (five principal cases); RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. 
DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON 
THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHORSHIP 806–45 (9th ed. 2005) (four principal cases); JULIE 
E. COHEN, LYDIA PALLAS LOREN, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & MAUREEN A. O’ROURKE, COPYRIGHT IN 
A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 676–88 (2d ed. 2006) (three principal cases); ROBERT A. 
GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS 1005, 1026–31 (7th ed. 
2006) (one principal case); CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER OCHOA, 
COPYRIGHT LAW 974–85 (7th ed. 2006) (one principal case). 
There are two casebooks that are exceptions to the rule and that include a generous set of 
materials for teaching rights of publicity, although we wonder how many teachers using these 
books are able to devote more than a handful of class sessions to the topic.  See SHELDON W. 
HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, AND MORAL RIGHT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY INTERESTS 524–634 (4th ed. 2000) (eighteen 
principal cases); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID NIMMER, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION 
INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, ILLUSTRATED 1191–1341 (7th ed. 
2006) (thirteen principal cases). 
 3. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL 
H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 62–65 (6th ed. 2006) (one principal case); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON 
H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 281–83 (2006) 
(notes only); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 86–102 (5th ed. 2007) (one principal case); EDWARD H. RABIN, 
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL & JEFFREY L. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY 
LAW 1267–68, 1275–91 (5th ed. 2006) (two principal cases); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1129–40 (4th ed. 2006) (one principal case). 
 4. See, e.g., GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JAMES E. MEEKS, ELLEN S. PRYOR & JOSEPH SANDERS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 8–17, 1314–18, 1370–81 (4th ed. 2004) (three 
principal cases); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1082–99 (8th ed. 
2004) (three principal cases); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1208–28 (8th ed. 2006) (two principal 
cases); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE & 
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 939–52 (11th ed. 2005) (one principal case); HARRY SHULMAN, FLEMING 
JAMES, JR., OSCAR S. GRAY & DONALD G. GIFFORD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 1202–06 (4th ed. 2003) (one principal case). 
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single federal statute;5 and unlike trade secret law, rights of publicity are not 
the subject of a uniform state law adopted in the vast majority of states,6 in 
addition to a federal criminal law.7  Second, with the exception of performers’ 
rights in their performances (which comprise only a small subset of rights of 
publicity),8 rights of publicity are not subject to any international conventions 
or agreements providing for international protection.9  Third, the relative lack 
of attention given to rights of publicity may, to some extent, reflect the relative 
amount of litigation that actually occurs among the major branches of 
intellectual property law.10 
We believe, however, that these reasons do not justify the relative neglect 
that rights of publicity currently receive.  During the past eight years, each of 
us has taught a stand-alone course on rights of publicity at least four times.  
The course has varied greatly in format and in content over that time.  It began 
as a one-unit intersession course, taught for ten classes of one-and-a-half hours 
each, twice a day for one week.  It was expanded to a two-unit course in 
comparative rights of publicity, with foreign materials integrated throughout 
the course, for an overseas summer program; and it has also been taught as a 
two-unit, semester-long course devoted primarily to U.S. law, with a small 
comparative law component.  Over time, we have developed a set of illustrated 
course materials that can be used with any of these permutations.11 
The purpose of this Article is to explain why we believe that rights of 
publicity should be taught as a stand-alone course, why we believe that a 
course in comparative rights of publicity is worthwhile as a stand-alone course, 
 
 5. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000) (trademark), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2000) 
(copyright), and 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2000) (patent), with 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §§ 6:3, 6:8 (2d ed. 2007). 
 6. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/utsa85.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, 
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2][b] (2007) (listing 43 states that have adopted the UTSA). 
 7. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2000). 
 8. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 8:103–8:108. 
 9. For performers’ rights, see International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations arts. 4, 7, done Oct. 26, 1961, 496 
U.N.T.S. 43 (Rome Convention); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 14(1), concluded Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299  [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; World Intellectual 
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty arts. 5–10, Dec. 20, 1996, 
S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76. 
 10. Thus, a search of the Westlaw database CTAR (Reported Court of Appeals cases) for the 
years 2000 to 2006 resulted in 802 patent cases (headnote 291k!), 397 trademark cases (headnote 
382k! & trademark), and 280 copyright cases (headnote 99k!), but only 19 cases involving rights 
of publicity, together with an additional 65 cases involving rights of publicity in the ALLSTATES 
database, for a total of 84 cases involving rights of publicity (headnote 379IV(C)). 
 11. We hope to publish these materials as a casebook in the near future.  For the time being, 
these illustrated course materials are available from the authors on request. 
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and to explain some of the challenges and opportunities that the course 
presents.  Ultimately, we hope to encourage and persuade more of our 
colleagues at other schools to begin to offer rights of publicity as a separate 
course. 
I.  WHY TEACH RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY? 
We believe that a stand-alone course in rights of publicity is valuable and 
is worth teaching for at least five reasons. 
First, a course in rights of publicity provides an excellent vehicle for 
exploring the theoretical justifications and rationales for intellectual property 
law in general.  At various times, courts have invoked as reasons for 
recognizing rights of publicity all of the major theories underlying other 
branches of intellectual property: utilitarian, incentive-based rationales;12 
economic efficiency rationales;13 natural rights theories;14 misappropriation 
and unjust enrichment theories;15 and consumer protection.16  But while 
 
 12. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he 
State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary interest of the 
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”); id. at 576 (“[T]he protection 
provides an economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce a 
performance of interest to the public.  The same consideration underlies the patent and copyright 
laws long enforced by this Court.”).  But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n., 95 F.3d 959, 973–74 (10th Cir. 1996) (considering and rejecting this rationale outside the 
context of a performer’s performances); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: 
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 206–19 (1993). 
 13. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974 (“The second economic justification for the right of 
publicity is that it promotes the efficient allocation of resources, a version of the familiar tragedy 
of the commons argument used to prove the superiority of private property over common 
property.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 45 (7th ed. 2007); Mark F. 
Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 110–26 
(1994).  But see Madow, supra note 12, at 220–25 (criticizing this theory). 
 14. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The right 
of publicity . . . has been defined as the inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”) (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1:3); Pavesich v. 
New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905) (“The right of privacy within certain limits is a 
right derived from natural law.”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:2 (discussing natural 
rights theory).  But see Madow, supra note 12, at 136–37 (finding natural rights theories 
unpersuasive). 
 15. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“The rationale for protecting the right of publicity is 
the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 
F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Vindication of the right [of publicity] will also tend to prevent 
unjust enrichment by persons such as appellee who seek commercially to exploit the identity of 
celebrities without their consent.”); State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 
S.W.2d 89, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (“[The right of publicity] recognizes one of the basic 
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence that one may not reap where another has sown nor 
gather where another has strewn.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  This rationale is entirely 
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utilitarian, incentive-based rationales are historically important in both patent 
and copyright law,17 for rights of publicity those rationales seem to have been 
an afterthought, as the first mention of such a rationale came twenty-four years 
after the right of publicity was first recognized.18  Indeed, the right of publicity 
has been defined as “the inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity,”19 making it the closest thing we have in 
the United States to an intellectual property right based purely on a natural 
rights theory.  Rights of publicity therefore provide a good vehicle to explore 
the advantages and disadvantages of a natural rights theory: Does a natural 
rights theory provide greater or less flexibility to respond to new problems?  If 
the right of publicity is a natural right, what are its boundaries and limitations?  
Should it be inheritable after death?20  If so, how long should the right of 
publicity last?21 
 
circular; any enrichment that occurs is only “unjust” if one assumes that the celebrity has a right 
to benefit from his or her fame in the first place.  See Madow, supra note 13, at 179–205. 
 16. See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975; Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found., 733 S.W.2d at 99 
(“[R]ecognizing . . . the right of publicity . . . will further the public’s interest in being free from 
deception with regard to the sponsorship, approval or certification of goods and services.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 
5, § 2:8.  But see Madow, supra note 12, at 228–38 (questioning this rationale). 
 17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; JOYCE, LEAFFER, JASZI & OCHOA, supra note 2, at 14–
20, 52–54; Tyler T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 675, 694–95, 701 (2002). 
 18. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. 
 19. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §1:3 (emphasis added). 
 20. Compare Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 323, 329 (Cal. 1979) (common-law right of publicity is not descendible), with Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705, 250 
Ga. 135, 145 (1982) (common-law right is descendible and inheritable). 
 21. Currently, in those states that have a statutory post-mortem right of publicity, the 
duration of the right ranges from 20 years after the death of the person, see VA. CODE ANN. § 
8.01-40(B) (2007), to 100 years after the death of the person, see IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8(a) 
(LexisNexis 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1448(G) (West 1993), to indefinitely, so long as 
the right is exploited, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (2001).  See generally 2 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 5, § 9:18.  We are not aware of any judicial decision that recognizes a post-mortem 
common-law right of publicity that has expressly addressed how long the right should last or 
whether it should extend in perpetuity.  See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 
1355 n.10 (D.N.J. 1981) (“Since we are not directly faced with the issue of whether there should 
be a durational limit on the right of publicity after it is inherited, we will not decide the 
question.”).  Indeed, the difficulty of judicially fixing a durational limit was cited as one of the 
reasons for declining to recognize a common-law post-mortem right of publicity in Lugosi.  603 
P.2d at 430, 25 Cal. 3d at 822, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328; see also id. at 433–34; 25 Cal. 3d at 827–28; 
160 Cal. Rptr. at 331–32  (Mosk, J., concurring).  But see id. at 446–47; 25 Cal. 3d at 847; 160 
Cal. Rptr. at 344–45 (Bird., C.J.,  dissenting) (suggesting adoption of the then-existing copyright 
duration of life plus 50 years for the common-law right of publicity). 
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Second, rights of publicity overlap with and therefore provide a good 
comparison and a good complement to other types of intellectual property.  For 
example, rights of publicity in live performances can also be analyzed under 
the rubric of common-law copyright in unfixed works of authorship.22  Cases 
involving rights in characters23 and re-uses of copyrighted works raise the issue 
of overlap with and possible preemption by federal copyright law.24  
Remedies25 and some defenses (such as the first-sale doctrine26) are similar to 
those available in copyright27 and trademark,28 but other limiting doctrines 
(such as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine in copyright 
law,29 and descriptive and nominative fair use in trademark law30) have no 
equivalents in rights of publicity, which sometimes leads to different 
outcomes.  Rights of publicity also provide a good comparison with the 
consumer protection theory of trademark law.31  Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
 
 22. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 564–65 (1977) (noting that a majority of the Ohio Court 
of Appeals analyzed the cause of action as infringement of a common-law copyright, whereas one 
concurring judge and the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed it as a right of publicity); 17 U.S.C. § 
301(b)(1) (2000) (expressly permitting state law regulation of “works of authorship not fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 8:104–8:105. 
 23. See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918–22 (3d Cir. 1994) (contract with movie 
studio did not divest plaintiff of right to sue for use of character name Spanky McFarland); 
Lugosi, 603 P.2d 425, 432, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824–25, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 330 (Mosk, J., 
concurring) (distinguishing Lugosi as an individual from Lugosi in his role as Count Dracula). 
 24. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(action for use of voice in licensed sample from authorized sound recording was preempted by 
copyright law); Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 909-11 (7th Cir. 2005) (action for use 
of photo on product packaging was not preempted by copyright law); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 35 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (action for use of robots based on television characters 
was not preempted by copyright law), on appeal after remand, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), 
reh’g denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 25. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) (providing for actual damages or 
statutory damages of $750, in addition to infringer’s profits, punitive damages, costs, and 
attorneys’ fees). 
 26. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(recognizing the first-sale doctrine as a defense to resale of authorized celebrity merchandise). 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (providing for actual damages plus infringer’s profits, or statutory 
damages of between $750 and $30,000); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (providing for recovery of costs and 
attorneys’ fees); 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (codifying first-sale doctrine). 
 28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (providing for up to three times actual damages, 
infringer’s profits, costs, and attorneys fees); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 
F.3d 1073, 1074–77 (9th Cir. 1995) (summarizing first-sale doctrine under trademark law). 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (idea/expression dichotomy); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use doctrine). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (descriptive fair use); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (nominative fair use). 
 31. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1190–1208 (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] TEACHING RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 911 
Act provides a cause of action against anyone falsely suggesting that a 
celebrity sponsors or endorses a product or service.32  If that is the case, do we 
need a separate right of publicity?33  What types of uses does it cover that a 
false endorsement rationale would not?34  To the extent that a rights of 
publicity course overlaps with other intellectual property courses, it provides 
an opportunity to reinforce concepts learned in those courses, or to cover in 
more detail concepts abbreviated elsewhere for lack of time.  The course also 
can draw upon and reinforce tort and property concepts from first-year 
courses,35 providing additional opportunities for useful discussions. 
Third, rights of publicity are also an excellent vehicle for demonstrating 
and discussing the differences between common-law and statutory approaches, 
and the interaction between them.  The right of publicity began as an offshoot 
of the common-law right of privacy, which was first proposed as a separate 
theory in the famous law review article by Warren and Brandeis.36  Starting 
from contradictory common-law results,37 a “right of publicity” claim 
 
 32. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce any . . . device, or 
any . . .  false or misleading representation of fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, . . . shall be liable in a civil action.”); see, e.g., White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1401 (9th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 
610 F. Supp. 612, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 33. Cf. ETW Corp., v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The elements 
of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim are similar to the elements of a right of publicity claim 
under Ohio law.  In fact, one legal scholar has said that a Lanham Act false endorsement claim is 
the federal equivalent of the right of publicity.”); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1111 
(9th Cir. 1992) (vacating award of damages under Section 43(a) of Lanham Act as duplicative of 
damages under state-law right of publicity). 
 34. There are at least two answers to this rhetorical question.  First, the right of publicity 
covers celebrity merchandising cases, a use that is well established, but still controversial, for 
trademarks under the Lanham Act.  See, e.g., Au-tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006); Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 
510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising 
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005).  Second, the right of 
publicity relieves plaintiffs of the burden of having to demonstrate the elements of use in 
commerce, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.  See Dogan & 
Lemley, supra note 31, at 1208–13. 
 35. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 36. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 37. Compare Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 122 Ga. 190 (1905) 
(allowing claim in favor of a person whose photograph was used commercially without 
permission), with Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 171 N.Y. 538 (1902) 
(denying a right of action under circumstances similar to Pavesich).  Roberson was legislatively 
overruled the next year.  See Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1–2, 1903 N.Y. LAWS 308 (codified 
as amended at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1992 and Supp. 2007)). 
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eventually emerged from a federal court’s Erie38 guess about New York 
common law,39 and soon spread to other states.40  By contrast, state statutes 
have more recently become a favored solution.41  The course thus allows the 
 
 38. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 39. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(“We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York 
derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . .  This right 
might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”).  The federal court’s guess turned out to be faulty; the 
New York Court of Appeals disavowed the common-law doctrine thirty years later, see Stephano 
v. News Group Publ’ns, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 
(1984) (“Since the ‘right of publicity’ is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect of 
the right of privacy, which . . . is exclusively statutory in this State, the plaintiff cannot claim an 
independent common-law right of publicity”), leaving New York with only a statutory right 
limited to living persons.  See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992) (“A person . . . 
[who] uses for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any 
living person without having first obtained the written consent of such person . . . .”) (emphasis 
added).  There have been occasional efforts to enact a post-mortem right of publicity in New 
York, including two bills introduced in 2007.  See S. 6005, 2007 S., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); 
Assemb. 8836, 2007 Assemb., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007).  Those bills have been tabled until the 
fall session convenes.  See American Society of Media Photographers, Legislative Alert, 
available at www.asmp.org/news/spec2007/NY_publicity_bill.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); 
Jordana Lewis, Long-Dead Celebrities Can Now Breathe Easier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007 at 
B4. 
 40. See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834–35, 834 n.1 
(6th Cir. 1983) (Michigan law); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353–56 (D.N.J. 
1981) (New Jersey law); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 90 Wis. 2d 379 
(1979) (Wisconsin law).  For a complete list of states that have adopted the right of publicity as a 
common-law right, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 6.3 . 
 41. New York was an early convert.  See supra note 39.  California’s statute dates from 
1971.  Act of Nov. 22, 1971, ch. 1595, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3426 (codified as amended at CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997)).  However, California continues to recognize a common-law 
right for living persons alongside the statutory one.  See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 
971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no violation of the statutory right of publicity, 
but finding a violation of the common-law right of publicity); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 
460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); Eastwood v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346, 
149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (detailing differences between the statutory 
right and the common-law right).  The California legislature also added an express post-mortem 
right when the courts refused to recognize a common-law one.  See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 
603 P.2d 425, 431, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (Cal. 1979) (no common-law 
post-mortem right); 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1704, § 1 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3344.1 (West Supp. 2007)); cf. Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. 
Supp. 2d 309, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc., v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 
No. CV-05-2200-MMM (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2007) (declining to apply the statutory post-mortem 
right retroactively to celebrities predeceasing the date of enactment).  The California legislature 
has enacted an amendment in an attempt to overturn these two decisions.  See Act of Oct. 10, 
2007, ch. 439, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2008) (adding Cal. Civ. Code §3344.1(p), which reads “The rights 
recognized by this section are expressly made retroactive, including to those deceased 
personalities who died before January 1, 1985.”); id. § 2 (expressing the intent of the legislature).  
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professor to have students compare the merits of common-law approaches 
(flexibility, for example) with the merits of statutory solutions (promoting 
predictability and legitimacy from a separation of powers standpoint).  A 
corollary benefit is the ability to compare approaches from different states and 
to reflect on the merits of a state-by-state approach versus a uniform solution.42 
Fourth, because both common-law and statutory rights of publicity have 
relatively few built-in mechanisms for accommodating free speech concerns,43 
they are almost always met with a defense based on the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.44  The course therefore also provides an excellent 
vehicle for exploring the limits of the First Amendment and the virtues and 
disadvantages of constitutional decision-making on such a routine basis.  
Nearly half of the course is devoted to exploring free speech issues that arise in 
response to right of publicity actions.  Under what circumstances should the 
First Amendment provide a defense to the right of publicity in the context of 
news reporting?45  When should parody and satire be protected?46  Should the 
 
Similar bills were introduced in New York in an attempt to overturn the Shaw decision.  See 
supra note 39. 
 42. This also may reinforce and/or illuminate concepts learned in first-year courses. 
 43. The New York statute requires that the use be “for advertising purposes or for the 
purposes of trade.”  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2007).  The California 
statutes require that the use be “on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of 
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services,” CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997), § 3344.1(a) (West Supp. 2007), and they contain an express 
exception for news, public affairs and sports reporting.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1997), 
§ 3344.1(j) (West Supp. 2007).  But the common-law right of publicity in California requires only 
“appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or 
otherwise.”  See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417 (emphasis added). 
 44. See U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”); cf. Madow, supra note 12, at 145–46 (“[T]he power to license is the 
power to suppress.  When the law gives a celebrity a right of publicity, it . . .  gives her (or her 
assignee) a substantial measure of power over the production and circulation of meaning and 
identity in our society . . . ; power, ultimately, to limit the expressive and communicative 
opportunities of the rest of us.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569, 578–79 (1977) 
(First Amendment does not require protection where a human cannonball’s “entire act” was 
broadcast without his consent); Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 425–26 
(First Amendment does not protect deliberately fictionalized news account if published with 
knowledge of or in reckless disregard of its falsity); cf. Messenger v. Gruner+Jahr Printing & 
Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549, 553, 94 N.Y.2d 436, 442–43, 706 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (N.Y. 2000) (under 
New York law, plaintiff may not recover for use of her photo to illustrate a newsworthy article, 
even if it could reasonably be viewed as falsifying her role, unless her picture bore no relationship 
to the article or was merely an advertisement in disguise). 
 46. Compare White, 971 F.2d at 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (parody advertisement featuring robot 
in place of Vanna White was not protected by the First Amendment), petition for rehearing 
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), 
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First Amendment protect artists who depict celebrities in works of art?47  What 
about fictionalized portrayals of real people?48  For anyone who is interested in 
First Amendment jurisprudence and the protection of freedom of speech, the 
conflict between the First Amendment and a relatively broad intellectual 
property right based on “natural rights” theory provides an unforgettable 
means of exploring these issues.49 
Finally, teaching rights of publicity is just plain fun.  The cases are 
inherently interesting, because they involve famous celebrities and pop culture 
of today and of an earlier era,50 and because of the clash of fundamental values 
of personal identity and integrity versus freedom of expression.  In addition, 
the class is filled with opportunities to use visual examples, which helps keep 
the students interested and actively engaged.51  Over time, we have collected 
many such examples, from the advertisements at issue in the original right of 
privacy cases,52 to genuine limited-edition copies of the artworks at issue in the 
Three Stooges case53 and the Tiger Woods case.54  Students enjoy seeing these 
 
with Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n., 95 F.3d 959, 970–76 (10th Cir. 
1996) (parody baseball cards are protected under the First Amendment). 
 47. Compare Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10, 25 Cal. 
4th 387, 405–08, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 140–42 (Cal. 2001) (First Amendment does not protect 
reproductions of a “non-transformative” charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges), with ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936–38 (6th Cir. 2003) (First Amendment protects 
reproductions of a painting of Tiger Woods). 
 48. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455–62, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 
862–73, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353–60 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (First Amendment 
protects fictionalized movie portrayal of actor Rudolph Valentino); Gugliemli, 603 P.2d at 464; 
25 Cal. 3d at 876, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (Newman, J., concurring); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t 
Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 804, 808–10 (Fla. 2005) (First Amendment protects allegedly false portrayal 
of fishermen in movie THE PERFECT STORM (2000)). 
 49. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights Into Intellectual Property 
and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 
L. 283 (2000). 
 50. Among the celebrities involved in the cases in our materials are Muhammad Ali, Woody 
Allen, Johnny Carson, Clint Eastwood, Dustin Hoffman, Bela Lugosi, Groucho Marx, Bette 
Midler, Elvis Presley, Vanna White, and Tiger Woods. 
 51. On the benefits of using visual examples in intellectual property classes generally, see 
Rebecca Tushnet, Sight, Sound, and Meaning: Teaching Intellectual Property with Audiovisual 
Materials, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 891 (2008). 
 52. See supra note 37.  Both of these advertisements are available on the Internet.  See 
Privacy and Publicity in the Early 20th Century, http://historyofprivacy.net/Home7.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 53. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 106 
Cal.Rptr. 2d 126 (2001).  Professor Welkowitz authored an amicus brief on behalf of the 
defendant in the case.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 
21 P.3d 797, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (2001) (No. S 076061). 
 54. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).  Professor Ochoa 
recruited seventy-three professors, including Professor Welkowitz, to sign an amicus brief written 
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illustrations, and sometimes they change their view of the case after viewing 
the actual works, which may help students understand motives for litigation 
and judicial decision-making that may go unstated or unexpressed in the case 
reports.  In turn, students begin to see examples in the media and to bring them 
to class, which helps stimulate class discussion. 
II.  WHY TEACH COMPARATIVE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY? 
While not essential, a comparative55 approach to the course offers many 
virtues.  As more and more law school curricula include comparative and 
international courses, the inclusion of such material is becoming more 
commonplace, even in basic courses.56  Globalization, epitomized by the 
TRIPS Agreement,57 makes knowledge of non-U.S. law an appropriate and 
important part of an intellectual property student’s education.  Our primary 
intent is not to teach the details of the laws of several countries (although 
ideally we would like students to begin to grasp some of those details).  
 
by Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman of New York University School of Law on behalf of 
the defendant in this case.  See Tyler T. Ochoa, Introduction: Tiger Woods and the First 
Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 381, 389 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Seventy-Three Law Professors in Support of Jireh Publishing, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 
391 (2000). 
 55. Although we use the term “comparative” to describe the foreign materials that we use in 
our course, that term is not entirely accurate.  Most of the material is comparative, in that it 
includes cases and statutes from other countries to be compared with U.S. law.  However, a very 
small but emerging amount of material might be termed “international,” in the sense that it is 
intended to set standards for countries adhering to a particular treaty regime.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is a potential example, although it has not yet been used to set 
standards for anything resembling rights of publicity.  See Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 
1948).  The European Convention on Human Rights, which applies only to the forty-seven 
member states of the Council of Europe, is another potential source.  See Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; see 
also, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, Case No. 59320/00, [2004] ECHR 294 (holding that 
Germany violated Art. 8 of the Convention by failing to afford protection to Princess Caroline of 
Monaco against publication of pictures taken of her in semi-public places by paparazzi); David S. 
Welkowitz, Privatizing Human Rights? Creating Intellectual Property Rights from the European 
Human Rights Convention (draft manuscript on file with author). 
 56. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives Into the First 
Year Curriculum—Introduction, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 735 (2006). 
 57. TRIPS is an acronym for the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which was part of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9; World Trade Organization, 
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).  However, as noted above, TRIPS has no 
general prohibition against non-consensual commercial use of celebrity images, and there are no 
general international conventions protecting celebrity rights as such.  See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
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Instead, we want students to see in a general way how other countries approach 
similar problems, finding many similarities, but many differences as well. 
Organizationally, we put the foreign materials at the end of each topic, so 
that there is comparative material to use for almost every topic (although a few 
topics do not have readily available foreign material).  This approach seems 
superior to going through the entire course twice, although it does mean that 
students will encounter the foreign material before they have a complete 
picture of U.S. law. 
The use of foreign material presents certain challenges, but we believe the 
value added clearly outweighs the challenges.  Obviously, finding materials in 
English is an issue, and translating foreign language material is daunting (and 
beyond our individual capabilities in most cases).  But many primary and 
secondary materials, including court cases and law review articles, are 
available in English58 (including materials from Canada, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom).59  Although the quantity is dwarfed by the body of available 
U.S. material, it is more than sufficient for the pedagogical task. 
The greater challenge—and the greater reward—lies in comparing U.S. 
and foreign law.  On the surface, the approaches may appear fairly similar.  
Many countries have some sort of protection against non-consensual 
commercial uses of celebrity images, though often under unfamiliar rubrics.60  
Further, the idea of free expression, so central to a discussion of rights of 
publicity under U.S. law, exists in democratic countries all over the world.61  
However, the implementation of these legal principles in different countries 
reflects local nuances and cultural/legal norms and distinctions not easily 
grasped by an “issue, rule, conclusion” approach to the materials.  Rather, 
there is a kind of gestalt, which may be reflected in different results than might 
be expected in a U.S. court, but which really derives from different background 
legal norms.  Differences in the way countries approach free speech problems, 
for example, can lead to wonderful discussions of community oriented, as 
 
 58. See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, Symposium: International Rights of Publicity: Foreward: 
The Right of Publicity—Towards a Comparative and International Perspective, 18 LOY. L.A. 
ENT. L.J. 421 (1998). 
 59. See, e.g., Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002] EWHC (Ch) 367, aff’d in relevant part, [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 423, [2003] All E.R. 881 (U.K.). 
 60. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, “The Right to One’s Own Image”: Publicity and Privacy 
Rights in the United States and Spain, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (1999). 
 61. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”). 
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opposed to individually oriented, norms.  This often requires the professor to 
point out the subtleties, or at least to give sufficient guidance to students so that 
they may discover them for themselves.62  But there is great value in having 
students learn that democratic societies can approach similar problems using 
similar-sounding tools, but from very different perspectives.63 
One can also use the foreign materials to discuss both differences and 
similarities between common-law systems and civil law systems, and the 
extent to which each of those systems may be borrowing from the other.64  To 
the extent that the course includes foreign common-law materials (e.g., from 
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), it provides an opportunity to 
discuss the roots of tort and property law, and the divergent developments in 
each country, should the professor so desire.65 
In the end, including comparative materials makes students aware that U.S. 
law does not exist in a vacuum, and we hope, doing so gives them a wider 
perspective as they begin to practice, and even reform, the law. 
III.  CHALLENGES IN TEACHING RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
Teaching rights of publicity is not entirely fun and games.  There are some 
important challenges.  But meeting those challenges provides students with 
valuable learning experiences.  Two of these challenges are discussed below. 
 
 62. We do find some greater need for handholding here, as the foreign materials often seem 
strange to students: the style and length of foreign opinions often differs dramatically from U.S. 
material.  But some advance direction to students about these differences helps alleviate 
problems; and fortunately, there is nothing in the course to rival the extraordinarily complex 
opinion structure of World Trade Organization dispute resolution panels. 
 63. We should add that if there are students in the class from other countries, they can 
provide a very interesting perspective on the laws of their own countries.  One of us taught this 
course in a summer abroad program in France in a class that included a few French students, and 
occasionally foreign students visiting at U.S. law schools have taken our classes.  The inclusion 
of these students, assuming that their language skills are up to the task of participating in an 
American law school class, can be very useful during class discussions.  (The instructor should be 
aware, however, that most foreign schools utilize far less, if any, Socratic dialogue and student 
participation than do most American law schools.). 
 64. For example, common-law countries like the United Kingdom and the United States are 
increasingly relying on statutory solutions, whereas civil law countries, especially in Europe, are 
increasingly tied to systems where courts use cases and precedents, such as the European Court of 
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the WTO. 
 65. Especially with British materials, there is also the opportunity for smaller learning 
experiences, such as the need to read opinions and count votes carefully, because each judge may 
issue his or her own opinion, so it may not be obvious who is in the majority and who is 
dissenting until all opinions are read and all votes are counted.  See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., 
[2006] E.M.L.R. 1 (H.L. 2005). 
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A. Student Background Differences 
We do not have prerequisites for this course; we believe that the great 
majority of the material does not require a background beyond what upper-
level students generally bring to a course.  However, this means that students 
in the class vary widely in their prior knowledge of intellectual property, from 
little or none to relatively extensive.66  One problem is that students often 
believe that those with some prior knowledge of intellectual property have a 
significant advantage.  We believe such an advantage is slight—knowledge of 
trademark law, particularly Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, may be useful, 
but the level of understanding of likelihood of confusion needed for rights of 
publicity is not complex.67  There are also a couple of points where copyright 
concepts enter—preemption and first sale most notably.68  A little explanation 
of the concepts by the professor goes a long way here.  (Alternatively, one may 
choose to omit that material.)  Even where some slight advantage exists from 
prior knowledge of intellectual property law, we have not observed students 
being actively discouraged by it.  Students of all backgrounds can engage in a 
useful discussion about the utility of importing concepts from other intellectual 
property regimes into rights of publicity. 
A related problem is that students who have taken copyright or trademark 
may have seen some of the cases before.69  This is not an unknown 
 
 66. Students may also vary in their knowledge of international law.  However, only a very 
small amount of the material is truly international law, as opposed to comparative law, see supra 
note 55, and very few U.S. students are knowledgeable about the laws of other countries.  If the 
class includes foreign students (or students with such knowledge), that can add to the discussion.  
See supra note 63.  The professor need only take care not to allow such students to monopolize 
the foreign law discussions. 
 67. The “Vanna White” case, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 
(9th Cir. 1992), and the “Tiger Woods” case, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 
(6th Cir. 2003), include trademark law concepts, especially the latter; but we believe that our 
editing of the cases allows students to understand the problem even if they have not been exposed 
to those concepts before.  The registration provisions of the Lanham Act contain two relevant 
provisions: 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (c) (2000), the latter being more directly on point.  But these 
provisions occupy a very small part of the right of publicity course; their principal purpose is 
mostly to illustrate the fact that rights of publicity turn up in unexpected places. 
 68. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (preemption); 17 U.S.C. §109 (first sale doctrine).  In addition, the 
copyright fair use notion of “transformative” use, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994), is used in Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–
10, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 403–07, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 139–42 (Cal. 2001); and the California post-
mortem right of publicity statute incorporates the federal copyright term of life-plus-seventy 
years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (West Supp. 2007).  While interesting, 
the latter point is not critical to a conceptual understanding of the course.  We do expressly point 
out and explain the extent to which the Saderup opinion borrows from federal copyright law. 
 69. White, 971 F.2d 1395, reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), in particular, is a popular case; it appears in the 
rights of publicity section of all but two of the fifteen casebooks cited supra in notes 1–2. 
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phenomenon in law teaching.  Federal Courts, for example, uses a number of 
cases that students may have encountered in Civil Procedure or Constitutional 
Law courses.  The “trick” (and it really is not a trick) is to put the cases into a 
new context.  In the rights of publicity course, students are exposed to many 
cases they have not seen before; comparing the familiar cases to the new ones 
is a simple way of “transforming” a familiar case into something new.70 
Here is an example.  The suit brought by Vanna White against Samsung71 
concerning an advertisement depicting a robot in front of a “Wheel of Fortune” 
game board is commonly used in other intellectual property courses in their 
rights of publicity sections.72  In a trademark course, one might usefully 
discuss whether Vanna White’s invocation of the federal trademark statute was 
appropriate, in addition to discussing some of the basic aspects of California’s 
right of publicity laws.73  In a copyright course, one might logically discuss the 
preemption issue raised by Judge Kozinski’s dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc,74  as well as pertinent aspects of rights of publicity law.75  
But neither course is likely to focus on another interesting aspect of the case: 
the extent to which White’s claim was a substitute for a defamation cause of 
action, thereby avoiding the constitutional protection given to the latter.76  
Moreover, this issue is most usefully discussed in connection with other rights 
of publicity cases, which may not be available in a trademarks or copyright 
 
 70. Just having a different professor for rights of publicity than for other courses may be 
sufficient, since one professor may have a different perspective on intellectual property from 
another professor. 
 71. White, 971 F.2d 1395. 
 72. See supra note 69. 
 73. White invoked both statutory and common-law rights under California law.  White, 971 
F.2d at 1396.  Only the latter was held to be applicable, because of the narrower scope of the 
statute.  Id. at 1397, 1399. 
 74. The salient feature pointing to Vanna White was the Wheel of Fortune set, the copyright 
to which is not owned by Vanna White.  If the copyright owner licenses the use, should White’s 
right of publicity nevertheless trump the license, which derives from the federal copyright statute?  
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 
1315–16 (9th Cir. 1995) (action for licensed use of robots based on television characters was not 
preempted by copyright law), on appeal after remand, 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), reh’g 
denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 75. This might focus on the similarity between rights of publicity and protection against 
copying—protection without having to demonstrate likelihood of confusion, a general trademark 
requirement—which is part of the bundle of rights given to a copyright owner.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§106(1) (2000). 
 76. See David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White 
Case and the Limits Of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 95–100 (1995), and David S. 
Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator As Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the 
Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651, 
652–62 (2005), for discussions of this issue. 
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casebook.77  Of course, one could raise the defamation issue in a trademarks or 
copyright course, but the issue has less of a logical connection to either of 
those courses.  We believe the defamation issue is better discussed in the 
context of a separate rights of publicity course, where the tort background of 
the claim can be brought to bear on the defamation problem. 
B. Knowledge of Constitutional Law 
Students in the course also vary in the depth of their knowledge of 
constitutional law in general, and First Amendment law in particular.  Second-
year students may not have reached the topic at all; and, as constitutional law 
professors become more pressed for time as the material expands, freedom of 
speech in a commercial context may receive little attention.  A rights of 
publicity course presents a welcome opportunity to fill this gap and to expand 
the students’ horizons by putting First Amendment law into a new context.78 
Moreover, First Amendment analyses of intellectual property are too often 
given short shrift by courts.79  Giving students a solid grounding in the relevant 
constitutional law principles in the context of an intellectual property course 
will make them better advocates for their clients and less likely to overlook, or 
to inadequately analyze, the applicability of constitutional law to intellectual 
property.80  These principles are also relevant to trademark and copyright 
 
 77. See, for example, Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
634 (Cal. 2003), and Eastwood v. Super. Ct.of L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 149 Cal. App. 3d 
409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), both of which were decided under California law (and both of which 
rejected the right of publicity claim on First Amendment grounds), and Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 
110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003), decided under Missouri law, which rejected a First Amendment 
defense despite evidence that the plaintiff was suing primarily because he objected to being 
depicted in a comic book as a Mafia goon.  See also Welkowitz & Ochoa, supra note 76, at 656–
57.  Professors Welkowitz and Ochoa authored an amicus brief in Winter in support of the 
defendants.  Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant DC Comics, et al., Winter v. DC 
Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 30 Cal. 4th 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634 (Cal. 2003) (No. S108751). 
 78. Indeed, it is not just First Amendment law that is relevant.  Students who have taken 
constitutional law will be interested to learn that the first court to recognize a right of privacy 
grounded its ruling in substantive due process.  See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 
68, 71, 122 Ga. 190, 197 (Ga. 1905) (“The right of privacy . . .   [is] guarantied [sic] to persons in 
this state both by the Constitutions of the United States and of the state of Georgia, in those 
provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of 
law.”). 
 79. See e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Welkowitz & Ochoa, supra note 76, at 
662–70; Zimmerman, supra note 50, at 292–94. 
 80. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 529 (2000); Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater 
First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2006). 
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law,81 but such courses must cover a large body of law, and professors may not 
be able to give constitutional issues significant class time.  As noted above, a 
rights of publicity course is an excellent vehicle for integrating constitutional 
law principles into an intellectual property course.82 
CONCLUSION 
Before concluding, we should expressly acknowledge that like many (but 
by no means all) academics, we share the belief that the balance between 
intellectual property and freedom of speech has tipped too far toward 
overprotection of content owners and away from the public domain.  But 
regardless of where one stands on these issues, it should be clear that rights of 
publicity form an important part of the fabric of intellectual property and an 
important and visible battleground in the free speech debate.  We hope that 
setting forth our thoughts about the course, and making our course materials 
available to others, will encourage and persuade more of our colleagues at 
other schools to offer rights of publicity as a stand-alone course in the near 
future. 
 
 81. See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: 
Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973 (2007); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark 
Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887 (2005); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Lisa P. Ramsey, 
Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003); Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).  
But see David McGowan, Some Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 435 (2005). 
 82. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
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